Steve Witkoff, President Trump’s senior aide on Russia negotiations, is expected to kickstart talks with Tehran (File photo)
The rubric of the US-Iranian talks slated for Saturday in Muscat turned into a vanity fair of sorts — whether the talks should be called ‘indirect’ or ‘direct’. The US President Donald Trump sought direct talks and claimed that Iranians conveyed through back channel that they had no objection to it. Furthermore, Trump disclosed that indirect talks already started. While maintaining publicly that the talks will be ‘indirect’, Iranians didn’t call out Trump.
Accordingly, Trump nominated his trusted aide and longstanding friend Steve Witkoff to represent him at the talks. Tehran reciprocated with Abbas Araqchi, a veteran nuclear negotiator and brilliant diplomat, and currently the foreign minister.
Trump noted with satisfaction that Tehran has fielded a negotiator at the highest possible level. Interestingly, Trump made the announcement on the talks from the Oval Office in the presence of Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
Such hyper activism on the optics may create a surreal impression. After all, there is also a military build-up going on in the US base in Diego Garcia, including B-52 heavy bombers with a range of 10000 kms. But the Russian assessment is that the US’ mobilisation of military assets falls way short of the level of force strength required to start a war with Iran.
The presence of Araqchi and Witkoff at the talks in Muscat underscores that both sides are approaching the talks in all seriousness conscious of the real risk of a dangerous escalation of the present precarious situation around the Iran nuclear issue if concrete progress is not achieved in the negotiations by mid-2025.
The clock starts ticking for the E3 (France, Germany, and Britain) to move to restore the UN Security Council sanctions on Iran by invoking the JCPOA’s veto-proof ‘snapback’ mechanism for which the cutoff date is the month of October. Snapback also restores Security Council ban on uranium enrichment, further reactor development, and ballistic missile activities.
Tehran has warned that if the UN sanctions are restored, it may withdraw from the NPT in response and if that happens, it is no longer obligated to retain IAEA safeguards. But there is a gestation period of 3 months before Iran’s exit from NPT gets formalised.
Enter Russia. According to the 1992 nuclear cooperation agreement between Moscow and Tehran, “nuclear material, equipment, special non-nuclear-material, and related technology” as well as nuclear materials produced by the result of transferred technology “shall be under the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards” during their “entire period” of stay in Iran.
The agreement further stipulates that these materials “shall be used only for declared purposes that are not connected with activities of manufacturing nuclear explosive devices” and “shall not be used to carry out activities in the field of nuclear fuel cycle” that are not under IAEA safeguards.
Suffice to say, at the very least, Iran’s nuclear cooperation agreement with Russia may obligate Tehran to retain some IAEA presence. Russia’s economic interests in nuclear cooperation with Iran will also play a part. Besides, the recent Russian-Iranian treaty on strategic cooperation explicitly affirms Tehran’s commitment to nuclear non-proliferation. Russia also tends to prioritise a constructive engagement of the US in its foreign policies and its moderating influence on Iran lest it goes the North Korean way will be a significant factor in the US-Iranian negotiations. The situation around Iran has already figured more than once in the recent US-Russia exchanges since February including at the highest level between Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin.
During this week, against the backdrop of the talks in Muscat, President Masoud Pezeshkian made certain significant remarks. It is entirely conceivable that he was speaking for Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
First, Pezeshkian said Khamenei is “not opposed to US entities investing capital” in the Iranian economy. Succinctly put, this is a radical departure from Iran’s traditional stance.
Second, Pezeshkian said, “We are open to dialogue, but with dignity and pride, we will not compromise on our achievements and we will not make deals (on them).” In effect, Pezeshkian has notified that any suggestions that the only acceptable deal with Iran must include complete dismantlement of the country’s nuclear program will be a non-starter.
Third, Pezeshkian not only reiterated Iran’s rejection of nuclear weapons but stated its willingness to be subject to robust safeguards. As he put it, “We are not looking for an atomic bomb. Who is setting policy above the Leader of the Islamic Revolution who has officially announced that we are not looking for a nuclear bomb? Check it a thousand times. You can verify a thousand times that we don’t have atomic bombs, but we need nuclear science and nuclear energy.”
Fourth, Pezeshkian also had a message of sorts for Israel. He said, “We are not looking for war, but we will stand strong against any aggression with the knowledge and power that our scientists have created. The more they harm us, the more powerful we will become, and the stronger we will stand against any threat they pose to us.”
Taken together, these remarks by Pezeshkian would give a fair idea of what the contours of a possible settlement of the nuclear issue could be as the talks proceed.
Most importantly, Iran seeks an economic partnership with the US and implicit in it is the unspoken readiness for political and diplomatic ties. Iran’s approach bears an uncanny resemblance to what Russia has adopted in its nascent dialogue with the Trump administration. Trump’s choice of Witkoff as the negotiator for Iran can be seen as a signal that the US is open to explore opportunities of economic cooperation with Iran not only as an underpinning to the normalisation process but on intrinsic terms.
By the way, Washington Post has reported that Witkoff is willing to travel to Tehran, if invited. Certainly, Tehran pins hopes on Witkoff bringing new thinking into the paradigm. Do not be surprised if he travels to Tehran in a near future.
That said, the Trump administration must appreciate that Iran lives in a tough security environment and is attempting to use its nuclear threshold status as a deterrent. Therefore, what is possible is a combination of limits and monitoring that can adequately reduce proliferation risks.
The onus is on Witkoff to articulate behind closed doors the realistic US objectives for a nuclear deal, bearing in mind that politics is the art of the possible. This involves refraining from calls for the complete dismantlement of the Iranian nuclear program, and, equally, the projection of constructive ideas as to how Tehran will benefit from an agreement with the US.
When I visited Tehran last June to observe the presidential election, a topic that came up in almost all conversations and TV interviews was: What to expect from a Trump administration? What I could sense was that contrary to what Israeli media management strives to project to muddy waters, Tehran has no revenge mentality and instead senses that Trump’s priorities in a second term are not going to be about projection of power or military interventions but the regeneration of America.
As a civilisation state that was never colonised through millennia, Iranian culture is highly pragmatic but it will never surrender its legitimate interests or compromise under pressure. In this respect, it is a unique country in the region. (See an outstanding policy brief by Washington-based Arms Control Association titled The Art of a New Iranian Nuclear Deal in 2025.)
Iran’s relevance to the regeneration of the American economy (MAGA) is self-evident. Apart from vast mineral resources, Iran’s human resources can give a solid underpinning to economic and technological partnership with American business and industry. An enduring nuclear deal with Iran is also best achieved through Witkoff offering, with the imprimatur of Trump, an overarching relationship to reengage with Iran as a partner after over four decades of acrimony.